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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Antonio Sandoval appeals from the district court’s Restitution Order,
claiming restitution may not be awarded for costs of extradition.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Sandoval on one count of delivery of a controlled
substance (marijuana). (R., pp.7-8.) Sandoval pled guilty pursuant to a binding
I.C.R. 11 plea agreement, which agreement allowed the state to “reserve
restitution.” (R., pp.44-50, 53-56.) Consistent with the terms of the agreement,
the court imposed a suspended unified three and one-half year sentence, with
one year fixed. (R., pp.53-54, 62-64.) The court also awarded restitution in the
amount of $585.00 for extradition costs incurred in extraditing Sandoval from
Nevada. (R., pp.65-70.) Sandoval filed a notice of appeal timely only from the
court’s restitution order. (R., pp.76-78.)

1

ISSUE
Sandoval states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by awarding restitution to the Sheriff’s
Office for the costs of extraditing Mr. Sandoval to Idaho?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Sandoval failed to show the district court erred in awarding restitution
costs associated with extraditing Sandoval from Nevada?
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ARGUMENT
Because Extradition Costs Are Properly Included In A Restitution Award,
Sandoval Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Restitution Order
A.

Introduction
The district court awarded $585.00 for the costs of extraditing Sandoval

from Nevada. (R., pp.65-70.) Sandoval claims, as he did below, that extradition
costs may not be included in a restitution award. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-8; R.,
pp.71-72.)

Sandoval is incorrect.

The plain language of I.C. § 37-2732(k)

supports the district court’s determination that Sandoval may be ordered to pay
the costs of extradition.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed

to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412,
417 (Ct. App. 2013). The trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249
P.3d 398, 401 (2011).
In considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
“conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine” whether the trial court (1) “correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion”; (2) “acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it”; and (3) “reached its decision by an exercise of

3

reason.” State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App.
2014) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
C.

The District Court’s Restitution Award For Extradition Costs Is Authorized
By Idaho Statute
“Restitution may be ordered by the district court under I.C. § 37-2732(k)

once a defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime under Title 37,
Chapter 27 of the Idaho Code.”

1

State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257-258, 281

P.3d 90, 94-95 (2012). “Since I.C. § 37-2732(k) is short on specific guidance
regarding the nature of a restitution award or the procedure to obtain such an
award, we find guidance in the general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304.” Id.;
see also Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170, 345 P.3d at 229 (citing Gomez, supra, and
State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 252 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2010), supra). Under
that statute, a restitution award must be based “upon the preponderance of
evidence submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence
investigator.”

Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170, 345 P.3d at 229 (citing I.C. § 19-

5304(6)).
As contemplated by the plea agreement, the state requested restitution.

1

Sandoval does not dispute that he was convicted of a qualifying crime for
purposes of restitution under I.C. § 37-2732(k).
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The restitution requested was for the costs of extraditing Sandoval from Nevada
after an Idaho grand jury indicted him for delivery of marijuana. (R., pp.68-70.)
In support of this request, the state submitted an Affidavit of Extradition Costs,
which was prepared by a Canyon County extradition officer.

(R., pp.68-69.)

According to the affidavit, Sandoval fled Idaho “[f]ollowing the commission of the
offense” with which he was charged and, as a result, the Canyon County
Sheriff’s Office had to extradite Sandoval from Nevada. (R., pp.68-69.) The cost
of extradition was $585.00. (R., pp.69-70.) The district court, citing I.C. § 195304, entered a restitution order for that amount. (R., pp.65-66.)
Following entry of the court’s restitution order, Sandoval filed a motion for
hearing and an objection to the award, arguing “the amount of restitution ordered
exceeds the victim’s economic loss, as defined by Idaho law,” and claiming there
was no “authority to grant [the] Canyon County Sheriff’s Office restitution for the
cost of extradition.” (R., p.71.) The court conducted a hearing after which it
entered an Order Denying Defendant’s Objection to Restitution Order.
(Augmentation; see generally 4/7/2015 Tr.)
On appeal, Sandoval contends that restitution could not be awarded
pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 because, he argues, “his leaving [Idaho] had nothing
to do with this case or an attempt to evade arrest” and, therefore, the costs of
extradition were not the result of his criminal conduct. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6.)
Sandoval alternatively argues that restitution could not be awarded pursuant to
I.C. § 37-2732(k) because that statute “does not mention extradition costs” and
because I.C. § 19-4528 “specifically provides that extradition costs will be paid by
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the state or the county.”

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-8.)

Both of Sandoval’s

arguments lack of merit.
Idaho Code § 19-5304 is the general restitution statute. As Sandoval
correctly notes, restitution pursuant to that statute requires that the victim’s
claimed economic loss was the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. I.C. §
19-5304(1)(a) (defining “economic loss”); I.C. § 19-5304(2) (authorizing
restitution for economic loss). Idaho Code § 19-5304 does not, however, control
whether restitution was properly awarded in this case because Sandoval’s
restitution award is governed by I.C. § 37-2732(k). “A basic tenet of statutory
construction is that when two statutes conflict, the more specific statute controls
over the more general.” Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 502, 915 P.2d 724,
732 (1996) (citation omitted). While I.C. § 19-5304 may be used for guidance,
Weaver, supra, to the extent it conflicts with I.C. § 37-2732(k), I.C. § 37-2732(k)
controls in cases involving convictions, like Sandoval’s, that are entered pursuant
to Title 37.

2

2

Even if the causation requirement in I.C. § 19-5304 applied to this case, it was
satisfied because Sandoval’s criminal act was both the actual cause and
proximate cause of the costs associated with extraditing him. See State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P3d 398, 401 (2011). Sandoval’s criminal
conduct was the actual cause of the extradition expenses because the costs
would not have been incurred “but for” Sandoval’s criminal act. Id. Sandoval’s
criminal conduct was also the proximate cause because a “reasonable person,
making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might
produce,” would reasonably expect that, if he committed a crime in one state,
then left the state, the state would seek to extradite him when that crime was
charged. Sandoval’s claim that he “left Idaho before he knew the grand jury had
returned an indictment against him” such that “his leaving had nothing to do with
6

Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) provides, in relevant part:
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this
chapter . . . , the court may order restitution for costs incurred by
law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. Law
enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited to, the Idaho
state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the office
of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney
offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for
the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement
officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation,
hearings and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution
expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of
employees.
Sandoval does not contend, nor could he, that he was not convicted of a
qualifying offense under I.C. § 37-2732(k) given that his conviction for delivery of
marijuana was entered pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B). (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.6-7; R., pp.7-8 (Indictment), 62-64 (Judgment).) Sandoval instead contends
that restitution may not be awarded pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k) because that
statute “does not mention extradition costs, while I.C. § 19-4528 specifically
provides that either the state or county will pay for costs incurred by law
enforcement to extradite a defendant back to Idaho.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)
Sandoval cites the “in pari materia” rule of statutory construction to support this
argument.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)

Sandoval’s argument fails because it

misunderstands the very principle on which he relies and it is contrary to the
plain language of I.C. § 37-2732(k).
As noted, I.C. § 37-2732(k) authorizes restitution for “costs incurred by law
enforcement agencies in investigating” violations of Title 37, which includes, but
this case or an attempt to evade arrest” does not change the causation analysis.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
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is not limited to, a number of activities including travel for law enforcement
officers “and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred.”
I.C. § 37-2732(k). Idaho Code § 19-4528, on the other hand, has nothing to do
with restitution.

Rather, that statute provides that, when a defendant is

extradited in relation to a criminal proceeding in this state, “and there is no
appropriation of state funds available for that purpose at that time,” then
“reasonable compensation” for extradition services “may be allowed and paid at
the discretion of the board of county commissioners of the county where such
criminal proceedings are pending from the general fund of said county.” I.C. §
19-4528. That a statute exists governing who is responsible for the costs of
extradition has no bearing on whether a convicted defendant may be required to
reimburse the agency that incurred those expenses.

If that were true, no

restitution would ever be permitted under I.C. § 37-2732(k) because prosecuting
and law enforcement agencies are obviously required to pay their employees on
a regular basis without waiting for convicted defendants to pay restitution awards
that are clearly permissible under the statute. Sandoval’s reliance on the in pari
materia rule does not compel a contrary conclusion.
The in pari materia rule of statutory construction provides that “statutes in
pari materia are to be construed together” in order to give effect to legislative
intent. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Elmore County, 158 Idaho
648, 653, 350 P.3d 1025, 1030 (2015) (citation omitted). “Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same subject.” Id. The statutes Sandoval cites,
I.C. § 37-2732(k) and I.C. § 19-4528, are not in pari materia because one relates
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to restitution and one relates to extradition. Indeed, Sandoval’s own argument is
premised upon the fact that I.C. § 37-2732(k) “does not mention extradition
costs” while I.C. § 19-4528 does. (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) Sandoval’s claim that
the statutes must be construed together is without merit.

Even if construed

together, Sandoval’s claim that such construction compels a conclusion that
restitution may not be awarded for extradition costs fails.

If anything, the

opposite is true because the only way to give effect to the legislative intent
underlying I.C. § 37-2732(k) would be to allow restitution for extradition costs,
which restitution would be awarded to whichever entity paid those expenses
under I.C. § 19-4528.
Sandoval has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
ordering him to pay for the costs of extradition.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
restitution award.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2016.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of March, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

/s/ Jessica M. Lorello
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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